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BOWERS V. BAYSTATE TECHNOLOGIES: USING THE
SHRINKWRAP LICENSE TO CIRCUMVENT THE
COPYRIGHT ACT AND ESCAPE FEDERAL PREEMPTION
BY: MERRITT A. GARDINER
INTRODUCTION
"The primary and most important claim of trade and commerce is
to give them surety against highway robbery. In the same way the
primary though merely negative demand of the sciences and arts is
to insure the workers in these fields against larceny, and give their
property protection. But in the case of a mental product the
intention is that others should comprehend it, and make its
imagination, memory, and thought their own. Learning is not
merely the treasuring up of words in the memory; it is through
thinking that the thoughts of others are seized, and this after
thinking is real learning."'
The framers of the United States Constitution agreed with virtual
unanimity to entrust copyright law within the federal sphere of national
power.2 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution
gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."3 Congress used this
power to regulate the exclusive rights in such creative works by enacting the
Copyright Act enumerated in Title 17 of the United States Code.4
The current version of the governing statute extends exclusive rights in
a variety ofcreative works, including books, periodicals, manuscripts, music,
drama, pictures, sculpture, motion pictures, sound recordings, architecture,
and computer programs.' The bundle of rights in § 106 of the Act gives
I G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right 74 (S.W. Dyde trans., London, George Bell and
Sons 1986).
2 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.01[A], at 1-4 (2002).
3 U.S. Const. Art. 1, S 8, cl. 8.
4 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2000). Upon original enactment in 1790, Congress subsequent-
ly amended the Copyright Act four times - in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976. The Copyright Act provides
protection to original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
s See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. SS 101 and 102 (a) (2000). Congress extended copyright protection to
computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of
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owners of such original works the exclusive rights in reproduction,
derivative works, distribution, performance, display, and digital transmission
performance.6  A violation of these rights constitutes copyright
infringement, actionable by the owner of the copyrighted material. The
succeeding sections of the Copyright Act set forth limitations on these
exclusive rights.7 In particular, § 107 creates an expansive limitation
applicable to any of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.8 Section 107
codifies what is known as the fair use doctrine. The fair use doctrine
provides that no infringement occurs where the use alleged is a "fair use ....
for purposes of such criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research."9
Technology opens up new doors for the fair use doctrine and its
applicability to the federal pre-emption of state law. The development of
software protected by federal copyright spun the right to fair use of the
software through reverse engineering. In order to undermine the right of
fair use in computer programs, software companies often distribute
computer programs in shrink-wrap licenses that prohibit reverse
engineering. However, a contractual restriction on reverse engineering,
governed by state contract law, directly conflicts with the doctrine of fair
use, authorized under the federal copyright system. Limiting the right to fair
use by prohibiting reverse engineering is an attempt to expand rights granted
under the Copyright Act. Thus, under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, courts should recognize that federal copyright law may
preempt state statutory attempts to prohibit reverse engineering.
The Federal Circuit recently confronted this issue in Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies, Inc.'o In Bowers, the trial court found, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed, that federal copyright law does not preempt state contract claims
regardless of whether or not the contract at issue attempts to expand or limit
the rights granted to copyright holders under the Copyright Act."
This note criticizes the Federal Circuit's majority opinion in Bowers as
incomplete and proposes a better solution to the problem. Part I reviews the
analysis and holding in the case. Part II argues that the analysis suffers from
a fundamental problem: the Federal Circuit's failure to apply the
original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.
6 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
7 WilliamW. Fisher Ill, Reconstruaing the Fair UseDoctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1659,1662 (1988).
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. S 107 (2000). "[N]otwithstanding the provisions of§ 106, the fair use of
a copyrighted work.. .is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. S 107 (2002).
10 Bowers v. Baystate Technolgies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
11 Id.
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constitutionally recognized doctrine of conflict preemption. Part III argues
that the majority opinion undermines the federal Copyright Act by failing
to recognize the doctrine of fair use and sides with the Federal Circuit's
dissenting opinion finding that the majority's approach and logic permits
state law to eviscerate an important federal copyright policy reflected in the
fair use defense.'2 Part IV sets forth a constitutionally sound analysis of
federal copyright preemption in Bowers so as to remain consistent with the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and mitigate the fundamental
problem created by the Federal Circuit's conclusion.
I.
The conflict in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies stems from the
development of a template to improve computer aided design (CAD)
software. 3 Bowers, the creator and patent holder of the CAD software,
distributed the software with a shrink-wrap license prohibiting any reverse
engineering.14  Subsequently, Baystate developed and marketed similar
software incorporating many ofthe features contained in Bowers' software.' 5
After intense competition between the two, Baystate sued Bowers for
declaratoryjudgment.' 6 Bowers counterclaimed for copyright infringement,
patent infringement, and breach of contract.'7
Following a jury verdict in favor of Bowers on all three counts,'"
Baystate filed timely motions for eitherjudgment as a matter of law or for
a new trial on each count.' 9 This Note only discusses the issue of federal
preemption based on the state breach of contract claim as it relates to the
federal copyright system.2"
12 Id. at 1335 (Dyk, Cir.J., concurring in pan and dissenting in pan).
13 Bowers v. Baystate Technolgies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
14 Id. at 1322.
15 Id.
16 Id. Baystate requested declaratoryjudgment that Baystate's products did not infringe Bowers'
patent, Bowers' patent was invalid, and Bowers' patent was unenforceable.
17 Id.
1s Id. The district court considered the contract and copyright claims coextensive. The district
court instructed the jury that "reverse engineering violates the license agreement only if Baystate's
product that resulted from reverse engineering infringes Bowers' copyright because it copies protectable
expression." The district court, however, set aside the copyright damages as duplicative of the contract
damages.
19 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1322.
10 However, the Federal Circuit affirms the district court's omission of the copyright damages
as duplicative of the breach of contract damages and does not reach the merits of the copyright
infringement claim. Furthermore, the patent infringement claim is beyond the scope of this note.
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Baystate argued that the Copyright Act preempts the prohibition of
reverse engineering embodied in Bowers' shrink-wrap license agreement.2 '
The Federal Circuit held that, under First Circuit law,22 the Copyright Act
does not preempt or narrow the scope of Bowers' contract claim.
23
The Federal Circuit based its holding on § 301 of the Copyright Act and
applicable case law.24 Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides that ".
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright .... are governed exclusively by this
title. 2z While recognizing the scope of§ 301, the Federal Circuit found that
the First Circuit does not interpret S 301's language to require preemption
as long as "a state cause of action requires an extra element, beyond mere
copying, preparation of derivative works, performance, distribution or
display."26 The First Circuit reasoned that the contract claim, requiring
findings of mutual asset and consideration, is sufficient to render it
qualitatively different from copyright infringement.2 7  Furthermore, the
Court found that the shrink-wrap agreement was far broader than the
protection afforded by copyright law.28
II.
The Federal Circuit's opinion is incomplete and fails to recognize the
doctrine of conflict preemption. The court's preemption analysis is,
therefore, inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause ofthe U.S. Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause allows the federal government to prohibit states
from passing laws in conflict with federal law.29 Thus, any state law in
conflict with federal law will be preempted. There are three ways in which
Congress may preempt state regulation: by expressly stating the preemption
21 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1323.
2- Id. First Circuit law is applicable as the law of the circuit from which the appeal is taken.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1324.
25 17 U.S.C. S 301(a) (2000).
26 See Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324. (citing Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36
F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 9 F.3d
823, 847 (10th Cir. 1993)) and Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir.
1992).
27 Id. at 1324. (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
"1 Id. at 1326.
-9 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, S 2 ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, and Anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
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("express preemption"), by enacting a regulation with which the state
regulation in fact conflicts ("conflict preemption"), or by enacting a system
of regulations so comprehensive as to displace all state regulations even if
they do not conflict with any specific federal one ( "occupying the field").3"
Express preemption is where a federal statute explicitly preempts state law.31
A court may question the extent of the express preemption in order to
determine whether the state law at issue falls within the category of laws that
are preempted by federal law. 32 Conflict of law preemption occurs when it
is impossible to comply with both state and federal law or when the state law
prevents the accomplishment of Congress' objectives in enacting the federal
regulation.33 By contrast, field preemption means that there is no federal
regulation with which the state law conflicts (otherwise preemption by
conflict would occur). Therefore, finding preemption in this category
means that the particular federal regulations do not expressly resolve the
question of preemption. s In other words, the system of federal regulations
is so comprehensive that it must implicitly preempt any state regulations
attempting to accomplish the same objectives.
Federal copyright law may preempt state claims in either of two ways:
by express preemption or through implied conflict preemption.36 There is
no field preemption because the clause of the Constitution granting to
Congress the power to issue copyrights does not provide that such power
shall vest exclusively in the federal government. Moreover, the
Constitution does not provide that such power shall not be exercised by the
30 See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Mgmt, 505 U.S. 88 (1992); See also English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496
U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
31 See Shawv. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (where the Federal Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts all State laws insofar as they [relate) to any employer benefit
plan, covered by ERISA but also provides that the preemption provision shall not impair any other
federal law).
32 Id.
33 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
34 Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 381-382 (3d ed. 1996).
35 Id. (citing Farmers Educ. I & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959), which
held that the Federal Communications Act, requiring broadcasters to carry some political speeches
without censoring them, occupied the field and therefore immunized broadcasters from liability under
state libel laws).
36 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. "Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two
types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is 'so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,' and
conflict pre-emption, where 'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility,' or where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.'"
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States.37 However, Congress has to a limited extent expressly "preempted
the field" of copyright by enacting § 301 of the Copyright Act.38 Section 301
of the Copyright Act provides that ".... all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright ... in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright ... whether
published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title ... no person
is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State., 39 Even if express preemption fails,
however, there may be conflict preemption. Conflict preemption would
exist if enforcement of the state claim prevents the accomplishment of
Congress' objectives in enacting the Copyright Act.
The reasoning in Bowers is flawed because the Federal Circuit fails to
apply the test for implied conflict preemption. Problematically, the Federal
Circuit relies on Data General and ProCD to support its finding. However,
the reasoning and analysis in both Data General and ProCD are flawed in that
they both fail to discuss the applicability of conflict preemption as it applies
to the federal preemption of state laws. Section 301 of the Copyright Act
only expressly preempts laws that grant rights equivalent to copyright. 40 In
the alternative, conflict preemption derives from the U.S. Constitution's
Supremacy Clause, Article VI, and its Intellectual Property Clause, Article
I, Section 8.41 As previously discussed, conflict preemption occurs when
either the federal and state laws directly conflict, so that it is physically
impossible for a party to comply with both, or a state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. "41 Where a State attempts to protect that which
Congress intended to be free from restraint or to free that which Congress
intended to protect, there is a conflict between federal copyright law and the
state claim.43 Conflict preemption also occurs if a state law were to restrict
the reach of the Copyright Act.44 The Federal Circuit's majority opinion,
37 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973).
38 Mark A. Lemley, Amid Curiae Brief in Support of Petition or Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En
Banc, Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. (2002), available at http://www.acm.org/usacm/Briefs/
bowersVbaystatebrie.htm. as of Jan. 27, 2003.
39 17 U.S.C. S 301 (2000).
40 17 U.S.C. S 301 (2001). See also Lemley, supra note 38.
41 Article VI, U.S. Constitution; Article 1, § 8, cl. 8, U.S. Constitution. See also Lemley, supra
note 37.
42 California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987). See also Lemley, supra
note 37.
43 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559.
44 Lemley, supra note 38.
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however, does not discuss whether enforcing a contractual restriction on
reverse engineering would have the effect of restricting that which the
Copyright Act intended to be free from restraint.
In ASCAP v. Pataki, a New York District Court preempted an
amendment to a state statute which imposed certain notice requirements on
performing rights societies conducting copyright infringement investigations
for their member copyright holders.4s The district court found that "because
the notice provisions imposed a notice requirement on copyright enforcers,
and made non-compliance with such requirements actionable by the alleged
infringer, the provisions hindered the realization of the federal copyright
scheme."46 In addition, the notice requirements attempted to limit the time
in which copyright owners could bring a copyright claim, thus, conflicting
with the statute of limitations provided under federal copyright law.47
Finally, the remedies provided in the amendment stood as an obstacle to the
enforcement of the federal copyright statute by permitting the alleged
infringer to offset federal copyright damages awarded against him with
damages entitled to under the state provision.48 The state statute in Pataki
required conflict preemption because it attempted to restrict the reach of
federal copyright by restricting the circumstances in which a copyright
holder could bring a claim of infringement. 49 As in Pataki, the state claim in
Bowers attempts to restrict the reach of federal copyright law using a state
governed contract prohibiting reverse engineering, a recognized fair use
permitted under § 107 of the Copyright Act.
Just as contractual restrictions on reverse engineering can conflict with
federal copyright law, they can also conflict with federal patent law.
0
Confronted with such a situation in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision held that a Florida statute,
prohibiting the unauthorized use of a direct molding process to replicate
manufactured boat hulls, conflicted with the federal patent law and was,
thus, preempted under the Supremacy Clause. 5' The Court described the
45 1997 WL 438849 (S.D.N.Y.). Plaintiffs, ASCAP and BMI, are performing rights societies
whose members are the creators and owners of copyrighted musical compositions. Such societies are
authorized by their members to detect and police infringements of their copyrights, which is necessary
to the enforcement of the copyright law. Prior to the filing of a complaint alleging copyright
infringement, such societies send a final letter notifying the proprietor of the results of the investigation




49 See Lemley, supra note 38.
so Lemley, supra note 38.
51 489 U.S. 141 (1989). See Lemley, supra note 38, at 6.
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Florida statute as "prohibiting the entire public from engaging in a form of
reverse engineering" that is otherwise permissible. 2  Furthermore, the
Court stated that "the States may not offer patent-like protection to
intellectual property creations which would otherwise remain unprotected
as a matter of federal law.", 3 If such a prohibition conflicts with federal
patent law, a blanket enforcement of contractual restrictions on software
reverse engineering must also conflict with the fair use doctrine under
federal copyright law. The dissentingJudge in Bowers correctly notes that
in the patent context, reverse engineering is viewed as an important right of
the public.54 As in Bonito Boats, the contractual restriction in Bowers prohibits
the entire public from engaging in a form of reverse engineering that is
otherwise permissible under § 107 of the Copyright Act.
UI.
The Federal Circuit's majority opinion on the issue of preemption in
Bowers undermines the federal Copyright Act because it fails to recognize the
doctrine of fair use. Furthermore, failure to apply the test for conflict
preemption leaves § 107 of the Copyright Act without substantive meaning.
Section 107 of the Copyright Act permits certain fair uses as a defense to
copyright infringement. 5 Under § 107 no copyright infringement occurs
where the use is a "fair use.. for purposes such as criticism, comments, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research". 6 The purposes expressly
permitted in the language of § 107 are not, however, all-inclusive. When
Congress enacted § 107 they expected that courts would adapt fair use
exceptions to accommodate technological innovations.
5 7
The shrink-wrap license at issue in Bowers prohibits reverse
engineering. Reverse engineering, also known as decompilation, is the
general process of analyzing a technology specifically to ascertain how it was
designed or how it operates-taking something apart to see what makes it
tick.58 Reverse engineering is an important part of the scientific method as
52 Bonita Boats, 489 U.S. at 160.
53 Id. at 156.
54 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336,(Dyk, Cir.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
55 17 U.S.C. S 107 (2001).
_% Id.
57 H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
s8 See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Softvare Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 843 (1994). There are essentially two reasons why one would need to perform software reverse
engineering:. (1) to understand how a computer program really works; and (2) to understand why a
computer program really does not work. Combining these two reasons together, software engineers
often conduct reverse engineering with the desire to produce an improved version of the program under
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well as technological development. 9 Generally, it can be an important part
ofallowing independent manufacturers to participate in competitive markets
that reward improvements made on dominant products.'
The way in which commercially developed software is published makes
reverse engineering a complicated process.61 The reverse engineering of
software generally requires an incidental act of reproduction and/or
adaptation of the underlying computer program.62 The Copyright Act,
however, only expressly allows the owner of a copy of a computer program
to make an additional copy if the copy is an essential step in the utilization
of the computer program or such copy is an archival or backup copy. As
a result, software companies often argue that such copies are infringements
under the Copyright Act. 64 Reverse engineering, however, is a judicially
recognized fair use.6
The Federal Circuit inAtari Games Corp. v. Nintendo, found thatAtari's
copying of Nintendo's protected source code was not authorized. 6 However,
observation; produce a new program that either interacts directly with the program under.observation
or exchanges information with it; or to understand why a new program fails to work under its original
construction. 19 U.Dayton L. Rev. at 846.
59 Chilling Effects Clearinghouse: Frequently Asked Questions about Reverse Engineering, at:
http://www.chillingeffects.org/reverse/faq.cgi.htm. "The process oftaking something apart and revealing
the way in which it works is often an effective way to learn how to build a technology or make
improvements to it. Reverse engineering is the process by which a researcher gathers the technical
information necessary for the documentation ofthe operation of a technology or component ofa system.
Through this process, researchers are able to examine the strength of systems and identify their
weaknesses in terms of performance, security, and interoperability."
60 Id.
61 "Computer programs are written in specialized alphanumeric languages, or "source codes".
In order to operate a computer, source code must be translated into computer readable form, or "object
code". Object code uses only two symbols, 0 and 1, in combinations which represent the alphanumeric
characters of the source code. A program written in source code is translated into object code using a
computer program called an "assember" or "compiler", and then imprinted onto a silicon chip for
commercial distribution. Devices called "disassmblers" or "decompilers" can reverse this process by
"reading" the electronic signals for "0" and "1", produced while the program is being run, storing the
resulting object code in computer memory, and translating the object code into source code. Both
assembly and disassembly devices are commercially available, and both types of devices are widely used
within the software industry". Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514, FN2 (9th Cir.
1992).
62 Id.
63 17 U.S.C. S 117 (2002).
64 Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, supra note 57.
65 See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo, 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Ent.
Corp. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); see also
Lemley, supra note 38.
66 Atari, 975 F.2d at 842.
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Atari was nevertheless exempt from liability because the Federal Circuit
found that the copying incidental to reverse engineering could constitute a
fair use.67 The court held that "the Copyright Act permits an individual in
rightful possession of a copy of a work to undertake necessary efforts to
understand the work's ideas, processes, and methods of operation. "" The
Atari court based its opinion on the Constitutional purpose for copyright
protection: "the promotion of 'the Progress of Science and useful Arts'"69
The Federal Circuit in Atari, as well as, a number of other courts correctly
recognize that the doctrine of fair use advances the promotion of the
progress of science by "encourag[ing] others to build freely upon the ideas
and information conveyed by a work."7 The Federal Circuit in Atari noted
that "[a] prohibition on all copying whatsoever would stifle the free flow of
ideas without serving any legitimate interest of the copyright holder."'" The
majority in Bowers recognizes its holding in Atari, that "reverse engineering
object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a
fair use. 72 However, the majority distinguishes Atari from Bowers by stating
that, "application of the First Circuit's view distinguishing a state law
contract claim having additional elements of proof from a copyright claim
does not alter the findings of Atari." In essence, however, the majority's
ruling adopts form over substance by allowing that which it previously
disallowed solely on the basis that it was done using a contract.7 3 The
Federal Circuit inAtari emphasized that an author cannot achieve protection
for an idea simply by embodying it in a computer program.74 Thus, as the
dissenting Judge in Bowers correctly stated, the "the fair use defense for
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. See Lemley, supra note 38, at 6.
70 Id. (quoting Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350
(1991)). See also Lemley, supra note 37 (citing Sony Computer Ent. Corp. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d
596 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992); Bateman
v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st
Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring), aJd by equally divided Court 516 U.S. 233 (1996)).
71 Atari, 975 F.2d at 843.
72 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325 (citingAtari, at 843).
73 "However, 'such an action is equivalent in substance to a copyright infringement claim [and
thus preempted by the Copyright Act where the additional element merely concerns the extent to which
authors and their licensees can prohibit unauthorized copying by third parties." Bowers, at 1335 (Dyk,
Cir.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36
F.3d 1147,1164-65 (1st Cir. 1994)).
74 "An author cannot acquire patent-like protection by putting an idea, process, or method of
operation in an unintelligible format and asserting copyright infringement against those who try to
understand that idea, process, or method ofoperation." Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336 (Dyk, Cir.J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (citing Atari, 975 F.2d at 842).
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reverse engineering is necessary so that copyright protection does not
'extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work,' as proscribed
by the Copyright Act."75 Furthermore, the Supreme Court characterized
reverse engineering as "an essential part of innovation, likely to yield
variations on the product that may lead to significant advances in the field".76
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Softvare, Ltd.,the Fifth Circuit held that a state
law prohibiting all copying of a computer program is preempted by the
federal Copyright Act.' In Vault, a copyright holder developed software
designed to prevent unlawful duplication of other software by locking it.7"
The plaintiff-copyright holder sold the software with a shrink-wrap license,
which prohibited purchasers from copying or reverse engineering any part
of the software.79 The defendant purchased a copy of the software and
reverse engineered it in order to find a way to defeat the copy protection
program."0 The defendant subsequently designed a similar product of its
own by incorporating knowledge obtained through reverse engineering
plaintiff's protected software.8' However, the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant did not infringe plaintiffs copyright by reverse engineering even
though the defendant used the information to produce similar software.82
The holding was based on the fact that the final version of defendant's
software did not contain any actual copied material. 8 The Federal Circuit's
majority opinion distinguishes Vault from Bowers by finding that preemption
of a state law prohibiting all copying of a computer program should not
extend to private contractual agreements supported by mutual assent and
consideration.84 However, the Fifth Circuit held that the specific provision
of state law authorizing contracts which prohibit reverse engineering,
decompilation, or disassembly of computer programs was preempted by
federal law because it conflicted with a portion of the Copyright Act and
75 Bowers,320F.3d at 1336 (Dyk, Cir.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (2000)).
76 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989).
n 847 F. 2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 257.
8o Id.
81 Id. at 258.
82 Id. at 270.
83 847 F.2d at 255.
84 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325.
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because it "touch6[d] upon an area' of federal copyright law."8a "From a
preemption standpoint, there is no distinction between a state law that
explicitly validates a contract that restricts reverse engineering and general
common law that permits such a restriction. '" 6
Further supporting its conclusion, the majority cites a number of cases'
finding that in some circumstances contractual waiver of statutory rights is
permissible. 87  However, of the cases cited by the majority, such
circumstances only arise where there is mutual assent and consideration or
where the statute's purpose is the protection of the property rights of
individual parties... rather than...the protection of the general public.88
Shrinkwrap agreements mass marketed to the general public are not always
supported by mutual assent and consideration and the validity of such
agreements present further questions of fact to be determined by the courts.
Furthermore, the purpose of the Copyright Act and the doctrine of fair use
embodied therein are to protect the fair use property rights afforded to the
general public.
Similarly, in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held
that the Copyright Act permits as a fair use persons who are neither
copyright holders nor licensees to disassemble a copyrighted computer
program in order to gain an understanding of the unprotected ideas and
functional elements of the program, as long as, the person seeking the
understanding has a legitimate reason for doing so and when no other means
of access to the unprotected elements exists.89 Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit found that a legal prohibition on reverse engineeringwould preclude
public access to such ideas and functional elements and "thus confer on the
copyright owner a de facto monopoly over those ideas and functional
concepts".90 Such a result, the court noted, would "defeat the fundamental
purpose of the Copyright Act," which is "to encourage the production of
85 Id. at 1337 (Dyk, Cir.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964)).
86 Id. (Dyk, Cir.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
97 Id. at 1325 (citing United States v. Spector, 55 F.3d 22, 24-5 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that a
contractual waiver of the statute of limitations defense constitutes an "effective waiver of defendant's
rights under the statute of limitations" if the agreement were properly executed, and the "waiver is made
knowingly and voluntarily."); Tompkins v. United Healthcare of New England, 203 F.3d 90, 97 (1st
Cir. 2000)(stating that "in some circumstances contractual waiver of statutory rights is permissible,"
citing Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghosue Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Mass. 1990)("a contractual
waiver of statutory rights is permissible when the statute's purpose is the 'protection of the property
rights of individual parties ... rather than ... the protection of the general public.'").
88 Id.
8 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514
90 Id. at 1527.
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original works by protecting the expressive elements of those works while
leaving the ideas, facts, and functional concepts in the public domain for
others to build on".91
The First Circuit recognized the right to copy methods of operation or
functional concepts for others to build on in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l,
Inc.92 In Lotus, the court found that a software menu command hierarchy
was an uncopyrightable method of operation or functional element.93 The
court noted that "original developers are not the only people entitled to
build on the methods of operation they create; anyone can. Thus
competitors may build on the method of operation that Lotus designed and
may use the Lotus menu command in doingso. t94
The Eleventh Circuit also endorsed the concept of reverse engineering
as a fair use in Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc.95 In a footnote, the court adopted
the position in Sega v. Accolade, recognizing that reverse engineering may be
a fair use. 6 The court found the Sega opinion persuasive in view of the
principal purpose of copyright-to promote the advancement of science and
the arts.97
Continuing this trend, Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., v. Connectix
Corp. recognized reverse engineering as a fair use defense to copyright
infringement. 98 In Sony the Ninth Circuit found that intermediate copies
made and used by the alleged infringer during the course of reverse
engineering were protected by the fair use doctrine.99 Sony discussed several
methods of gaining access to the functional elements of a software program
91 Id. at 1527.
91 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995). In Lotus, the holder of the copyrighted "Lotus 1-2-3"
shreadshect program and menu trees filed a copyright infringement action against a competitor. Lotus
1-2-3 is a spreadsheet program that enables users to perform accounting functions electronically on a
computer. A competitor released a similar program, which included "a virtually identical copy of the
entire Lotus 1-2-3 menu tree." In doing so, the competitor did not copy any of Lotus' computer code;
it copied only the words and structure of Lotus' menu command hierarchy. It included the menu
command to make it compatible with Lotus 1-2-3 so that spreadsheet users already familiar with Lotus
1-2-3 would be able to switch without having to learn new commands or rewrite their Lotus macros.
93 Id. at 815. The court found menu commands distinguishable from underlying computer
code because "while code is necessary for the program to run, its precise formulation is not". Id at 816.
94 Id. at 818.
95 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996).
% See supra note 18.
97 Id. (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,349 (1991) for the
proposition that that the purpose of the copyright clause (U.S. Const. Art. I, S 8, cl. 8) is not to reward
the labor of authors, but [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"). ) (quoting
98 203 F.3d 596 (2000).
99 Id. at 596, 602. Such intermediate copies were necessary to permit Connectix to make its non-
infringing Virtual Game Station function with Sony PlayStation games.
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by reverse engineering. Such methods include: reading about the program;
observing the program in operation by using it on a computer; performing
a static examination of the individual computer instructions contained
within the program; and performing a dynamic examination of the
individual computer instructions as the program is being run on the
computer."° The court held that intermediate copying could constitute
copyright infringement even when the end product did not itself contain
copyrighted material.1 'O However, the court nonetheless protected the
copying in Sony as a fair use because it was necessary to gain access to the
functional elements of the software. 2 Furthermore, the fact that the
defendant copied and used the ideas or functional elements to design its own
program was immaterial.0 3 In any event, the defendant's competing
program was a wholly new product notwithstanding the fact that its uses and
functions were substantially similar to the Sony PlayStation.'°4
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit in Alcatel U.S.A., Inc. v. DGI Techs. Inc.,
held that a contractual restriction on reverse engineering constituted
copyright misuse." The court held that the copyright holder had used its
copyrights to indirectly gain commercial control over products that were not
copyrighted, namely, its microprocessor cards."° Furthermore, the court
noted that any competing microprocessor card must be compatible with the
copyright holder's copyrighted operating system software. 07 Thus, to
ensure compatibility, a competitor would have to test the card.' The test
necessarily involved making a copy of the copyrighted operating system.'°9
"If the [copyright holder] is allowed to prevent such copying," the court
stated, "then it can prevent anyone from developing a competing
100 Id. at 599 (quoting Andrew Johnson-Laird, Softuvare Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19
U. Dayton L. Rev. 843, 846 (1994)).
101 Sony, 203 F.3d at 602-03 (citingSega Enterprises, Ltd. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 U.S. at 1518-19).
102 Id. at 603 (citing Sega Enterprises, Ltd., v. Accolade, Inc., 977 at 1518,1524).
103 Sony, 203 F.3d at 603 (citing Sega, 977 U.S. at 1524 and 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
104 Sony, 203 F.3d at 606.
105 The copyright misuse doctrine forbids the use of a copyright to secure an exclusive right or
limited monopoly not granted by the Copyright Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.
The doctrine bars a culpable plaintiff from prevailing on an action for the infringement of the misused
copyright. 166 F.3d 772,793 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970,972
(4th Cir. 1990) ("copyright law seek[s] to increase the store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding
... authors with the exclusive rights to their works for a limited time .... The granted monopoly power
does not extend to property not covered by the ... copyright"). See also DSC Communications Corp. v.
DGI Techs., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996).
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microprocessor card, even though it has not patented the card."" 0 Thus, the
copyright holder in Alcatel attempted to use a contractual restriction to
circumvent the federal patent system. Although Bowers patented the
software at issue in Bowers v. Baystate, the policy behind using contractual
restrictions to circumvent the federal intellectual property laws is equally
applicable."'
The dissentingJudge in Bowers stated that the preemption clause of the
Copyright Act covers "any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State."' 2 The majority in Bowers
cites ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the only other court of appeals shrinkwrap
case, as support for its findings. While the Seventh Circuit in ProCD stated
that "a simple two-party contract is not 'equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright"', its broad language does not
prohibit preemption in all circumstances." 3 ProCD involved a shrinkwrap
license that restricted the use ofa CD-ROM to non-commercial purposes."4
The defendant violated the license by charging users a fee to access the CD-
ROM over the Internet."5 The court held that whether a particular license
is generous or restrictive, a simple two-party contract is not "equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright" and is,
therefore, not preempted by federal Copyright law." 6 However, ProCD
offered the software and data for two prices: one at a lower cost for personal
use and one at a higher price for commercial use." 7 The shrinkwrap license
merely prohibited use of the lower priced software for commercial use. The
court found that the defendant wanted to use the lower priced software for
commercial use without paying the seller's higher price."' As the dissenting
Judge in Bowers correctly pointed out, the Seventh Circuit in ProCD also
emphasized that the license "would not withdraw any information from the
public domain" because all of the information on the CD-ROM was
110 Id. at 793-94.
ill Furthermore, the District Court in Bowers found that nojury could find that Baystate infringed
Bowers' patent.
112 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1337 (Dyk, Cir.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
113 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). "We think it prudent to
refrain from adopting a rule that anything with the label 'contract' is necessarily outside the preemption
clause." See also Maureen O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market BasedApproach,
12 Berkeley Tech L.J. 53 (1997).
114 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
115 Id. at 1450.
116 Id. at 1455.
117 Id. at 1454.
118 Id.
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publicly available." 9 Thus, the important distinction between ProCD and
Bowers is that the shrinkwrap license in Bowers is more than just a simple
two-party contract, it is an attempt to prohibit the right of fair use granted
to the general public under the federal Copyright law.12 °
Congress also acknowledged the importance of software reverse
engineering when they enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in
1998, which permits the circumvention of technological protections for the
purpose of engaging in reverse engineering. 121  Recently, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws amended the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) to prohibit the
enforcement of contractual restrictions on reverse engineering for
interoperability.1
22
Furthermore, foreign nations also recognize the importance of software
reverse engineering. The 1991 European Union Software Directive, enacted
throughout Europe, contains a specific exception for reverse engineering. 123
The directive provides that decompilation is often necessary to access the
'ideas and principles' which Article 1(2) excludes from protection and
Article 5(3) allows a legitimate user to ascertain. 124 Contractual provisions
contrary to this exception are invalid. 12  Other nations, including Japan,
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines and Australia also enacted such
legislation further recognizing the importance of reverse engineering. 126
19 Id. at 1455.
120 See Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1338 (Dyk, Cir.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). "The case before
us is different from ProCD. The Copyright Act does not confer a right to pay the same amount for
commercial and personal use. It does, however, confer a right to fair use, 17 U.S.C. S 107, which we
have held encompasses reverse engineering."
121 Lemley, supra, note 38, at 7 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (2000) and S. Rep. No. 105-190
(1998), at 13.
122 Uniform Law Commissioners, Amendments to UCITA Approved: Reverse Engineering for
Interoperability Expressly Authorized, Aug. 5, 2002, available at,
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusVpressreleases/prO8O502ucita.usp. "An information contract may not
prohibit reverse engineering that is done for the purposes of making an information product work
together with other information products." See also Lemley, supra note 38.
123 Directive 91/250/EEC on the Legal Protection of Software Programs 1991 O.J. (No. L. 122)
42, 45.
124 Id. at 45. "Article 6(1) allows a party entitled to use a program to decompile it "to obtain the
information necessary to achieve the interoperability ofan independently created computer program with
other programs" under three conditions. The decompilation must be done (a) by "the licensee or by
another person having a right to use a copy of the program" or the agent of either. It is permissible (b)
to obtain only "information necessary to achieve interoperability [that] has not previously been readily
available" to these persons. And it must be (c) "confined to the parts of the original program which are
necessary to achieve interoperability."
125 Id. at 43.
126 Japan allows the owner ofan authorized copy of a computer program to reproduce or modify
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In particular, the Polish Copyright Act provides the copyright owner
with the exclusive right to exploit the protected work for profit or
professional purposes .1 7  An independent creation of the same work
constitutes a complete defense to liability. Reproduction for personal use,
analysis, research, or education is also exempted from liability.
Furthermore, the legislation expressly allows reverse engineering, provided
that any resulting product meets the criteria of protection for a new work.
IV.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Bowers is not consistent with the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and fails to recognize the fair
use doctrine. Using the proper analysis, this section will analyze the issue
of preemption applicable to the facts presented in Bowers and discuss why a
uniform decision in this arena is required to promote the progress of science
and art.
Under the facts presented in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Baystate
contends that the federal copyright law preempts the prohibition of reverse
engineering embodied in Bowers' shrink-wrap license agreements. 21 While
courts should continue to respect the freedom of contract and should not
lightly set aside freely-entered agreements, federal regulation may, at times,
preempt private contract. 129 Although courts tend to respect the freedom of
contract and do not lightly set aside such agreements,' 3° the standard should
be different where the agreement has not been freely-entered into such as
the case with most mass marketed software containing shrink-wrap licenses.
Shrink-wrap license agreements 3 often prevent mutual assent as compared
to a general contract entered into between two parties. 2
the program when necessary for interoperability. 2-JAP International Copyright Law and Practice § 8
[2][c][v](1) (Matthew Bender & Co.) 2002. (Japan); The Copyright Act (CA) and the Computer
Program Protection Act (CPPA) were amended in 2000 in order to answer the need for greater efficiency
in the use and protection of works in rapidly developing technological environments. CA. No. 6134;
CPPA No. 6233 (Korea). See Ord. No. 92 of 1997 (Hong Kong); Copyright (Amendment) Bill of 1998
(Singapore); RepublicAct 8293 of 1996 (Phillipines); Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Bill
of 1999 (Australia). See also Lemley, supra note 37.
'-1 § 211, 212 Industrial Property Act of 2000 (Poland).
11 Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
19 Id. (citing Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v. Ristorante Toscano, 662 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Mass.
1996); Cf. Nebbia v. NewYork, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934)).
10 320 F.3d at 1323 (citing Beacon Hill CivicAss'n, 662 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Mass. 1996)).
131 Shrink-wrap agreements are agreements either printed on the back ofor included inside a box
containing commercial computer software. Often shrink-wrap licensing agreements contain software
use directives. See Doug Isenberg, The Gigalaw Guide to Internet Law 288 (Random House 2002).
132 Shrink-wrap license agreements may include a broad array of limitations favorable to software
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The shrink-wrap license in Bowers prohibits any reverse engineering of
the software. Reverse engineering is a judicially recognized fair use
permitted under § 107 of the Copyright Act.'33 Courts may interpret § 107
of the Copyright Act to either grant a right of fair use or provide a defense
to copyright infringement. Traditionally courts treated fair use as an
affirmative defense to a charge of copyright infringement. 14  Thus, any
attempt to restrict or limit the application of the fair use doctrine would be
an interference with the Copyright Act. The Circuit Judge writing for the
Eleventh Circuit in Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., argued that fair use is better
viewed as a right granted by the Copyright Act. 3 Thus, under § 301 of the
Copyright Act, any state claim attempting to grant or restrict that right
would be expressly preempted. This would include a blanket contractual
restriction of fair use. In addition, contractual restrictions on fair use rights
may also be preempted under the doctrine of conflict preemption.
Therefore, the correct analysis when enforcing a contract attempting to
prohibit or restrict the right of fair use, requires scrutiny under both the
express and conflict doctrines of preemption.
companies, including prohibitions against copying, reverse engineering, transferring, debugging, and
public display. License agreements are often inside the shrink-wrapped plastic or cellophane that seals
the box containing the software. This allows the software companies to argue that purchasers of such
software agree to abide by the terms of the agreement by simply tearing away the plastic or cellophane
wrapping. See MarkA. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1246-
47 1995. Cf Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (U.S. Gov't Printing Office) 1978. Consumer advocates, however, believe that consumers should
not be obligated to abide by the terms of an agreement they might never read, particularly if the
agreement is inside the box and, therefore, not visible until after the purchase is made and the box is
opened. See, e.g., Stephen J. Davison, et al., Open, Click, Download, Send: What Have You Agreed To? The
Possibilities Seem Endless, 717 PLI/Pat 71, 85 (2002) (citing Vault v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255
(1988) (holding that a shrink-wrap license was an enforceable adhesion contract and the state statute
authorizing such contracts was preempted by federal copyright law); and Step-Saver Data Systems v.
Wyse Tech. and Software Link, Inc., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that license agreement was not
part of the contract between the parties where they orally agreed to the sale over the phone without
mention of the shrink-wrap license agreement and as such, opening of the package was insufficient to
establish expressed assent to modify the contract under UCC 2-209)).
133 See 17 U.S.C. S 1201(0 (2002). See also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo, 975 F.2d 832,843-
845 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Ent. Corp. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega
Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79
F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Lemley, supra note 38, at 6.
134 Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, FN22 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1164, 1177 (1993) ("[Flair use is an affirmative defense..."),
135 Bateman, 79 F.3d at FN22. "Originally, as ajudicial doctrine without any statutory basis, fair
use was an infringement that was excused-this is presumably why it was treated as a defense. As a
statutory doctrine, however, fair use is not an infringement. Thus, since the passage of the 1976 Act, fair
use should no longer be considered an infringement to be excused; instead, it is logical to view fair use
as a right." Id.
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Congress enacted § 301 of the Copyright Act expressly preempting state
laws attempting to govern rights equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright.3 ' Section 301 preempts and abolishes
any rights governed by the common law or statutes of a state that are
equivalent to copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope
of federal copyright law. 137 To determine whether a contract is preempted
under § 301, there are two general inquiries: (1) whether the rights
embodied in the contract fall within the subject matter of copyright and (2)
whether the rights at issue are equivalent to the exclusive rights granted
under the Copyright Act. A contractual restriction on the right to reverse
engineer is a contract restriction on the right to fair use. There is no
question that § 107, permitting the right to fair use, falls within the subject
matter of copyright. The question of whether or not a contractual
restriction is equivalent to the rights granted under the Copyright Act,
however, requires a more intricate discussion.
The Federal Circuit majority determined that the contract claim was not
equivalent to any of the rights granted under the Copyright Act after
applying the "extra elements" test adopted by the First Circuit. 13  The
Federal Circuit relies on the analyses set forth in Data General and ProCD.131
Both ProCD and Data General attempt to resolve the question using the
"extra elements" test for express preemption. The "extra element" test
provides that if the act or acts of the competitor would violate both state law
and federal copyright law, the state right is deemed equivalent to copyright
and is, therefore, preempted. 4 " If, however, one or more qualitatively
different elements are required to constitute the state-created cause of action
being asserted, then the right granted under state law does not lie "within the
general scope of copyright," and preemption does not occur.
41
In Boivers, the Federal Circuit argues that the extra elements required in
a misappropriation of trade secret claim, e.g., proof of a trade secret and
breach of a duty of confidentiality, are analogous to the elements of mutual
1.16 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2001).
117 Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224 (1983).
138 320 F.3d at 1324 (citing Data Gcn. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36F.3d 1147,1164
(1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 847 (10th Cir. 1993)
("But ifan 'extra element' is 'requircd instead ofor in addition to the acts ofreproduction, performance,
distribution or display, in order to constitute a state-created cause of action, then the right does not lie
"within the general scope of copyright," and there is no preemption.'") (quoting I Nimmer on Copyright
S 1.01 [B] at 1-15)); See also Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992)
13') Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); ProCD, Inc.
v. Zcidcnbcrg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
1401 Alcatel USA, Inv. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 787 (5th Cir. 1999).
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assent and consideration required in a contract claim142  This analogy,
however, would allow state breach of contract claims to escape preemption
in any situation where federal copyright law may conflict merely because
contractual rights are involved. Unlike the trade secret claim in Data
General, a breach of contract claim is unique in that it may attempt to govern
rights protected under federal copyright law. For example, if the shrink-
wrap license in ProCD attempted to forbid users from exercising their rights
to fair use with respect to copyrighted material, it would be in direct conflict
with S 107 of the Copyright Act and should be expressly preempted. In
contrast to trade secret law, a contract can attempt to protect the same rights
protected under the Copyright Act.
In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit applied the "extra elements" test for
express preemption, finding that the mutual assent and consideration
required by the contract claim rendered that claim qualitatively different
from a copyright infringement claim."" However, the analysis in ProCD is
contrary to federal copyright policy and should not be persuasive in
determining the outcome in Boivers.14 4 If Bowers and ProCD are correct,
contract claims can never be preempted by federal law because all contract
claims require a finding of mutual assent and consideration. Thus, under
the Federal Circuit's reasoning, such elements would always satisfy the extra
elements test and all contract claims would be different from copyright
claims and escape preemption notwithstanding explicit constitutional and
legislative language proscribing otherwise. The argument that contract
claims are inherently different from federal copyright claims presents a
number of problems.14 - First, the reference to whether or not the contract
claim is equivalent to any of the rights protected under copyright law leads
only to an analysis of preemption under section 301, thus, ignoring the
doctrine of conflicts preemption.1 46  Second, the line between private
142 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324 (citingData General, 36 F.3d at 1165, holding that the Copyright Act
does not preempt a state law misappropriation of trade secret claim because in addition to copying, the
state claim required proof ofa trade secret and breach of a duty of confidentiality; and ProCD, 86 F.3d
at 1454, holding that mutual assent and consideration required by a contract claim rendered that claim
qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim).
143 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.
144 See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Itellectial Property Licensing, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 111 (1999); Maureen O'Rourke, Copyright PreemptionAfter the ProCD Case:A Market Based
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 53, 76 (1997) ("The court did not attempt to answer the policy
question of how the use restriction could be consistent with the copyright policy of maintaining a viable
public domain.); and Brett L. Tolman, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: The End Does NotJstify the Means Iii
Federal CopyrightAnalysis, 1998 BYU L. REv. 303 (1998).
145 Lemley, supra note 144 at 147.
146 Id. "Even if contract and copyright law are not equivalent, it simply does not follow that
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contracts and public legislation is further diminished.147 In other words,
enforcing contract terms that restrict copyrights afforded to the general
public by the federal Copyright Act blurs the line of distinction and
importance between federal copyright legislation and private contractual
agreements. 148 Furthermore, ProCD gives copyright owners monopolistic
control of their respective copyrights, notwithstanding the limitations on
such rights embodied in the federal copyright law.
149
In Crow v. Wainwright the Eleventh Circuit held that merely
characterizing legally recognizable rights as contractual rights does not
permit the conflicting state law to escape preemption.' s In Crow, the State
of Florida convicted Crow for selling bootleg eight-track tapes in violation
of a Florida statute. On appeal Crow argued that the state conviction should
be null and void because the Copyright Act preempted the Florida
regulation.' The State attempted to argue that there was no express
preemption under the second prong because the stolen property rights were
contractual rights. 1 2 Rejecting the State's argument, the court held that the
Florida statute was different from the copyright act only in that it required
an establishment ofscienter, on the part of the defendant. Furthermore, the
court noted that this distinction alone did not render the elements of the
crime different in any meaningfully way. "The additional element of
scienter traditionally necessary to establish a criminal case merely narrows
the applicability of the statute. The prohibited act - wrongfully distributing
a copyrighted work - remains the same.""13
federal law places no limits on the enforceability ofcontracts. Courts that take this position should also




141) See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 93, 109-10 (1997)("If copyright owners are free to use contractual agreements to restrict use, and
are then able to use copyright to prevent any use that is not subject to these restrictions, owners are
gaining absolute monopoly over their works...When owners exercise absolute monopoly, users' choices
become very limited... [Valuable uses.. .may not occur under a contractual regime... [Tihe lowstandard
of assent that ProCD...held to be sufficient for contract formation does not promote competition over
the terms.")
IS , 720 F.2d 1224 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
1i Id. at 1225.
152 Id. at 1226. "These rights, argued the state, belong to various performers, not under federal
copyright law but under various private contracts."
is Id. (citing Harper & Row, 501 F.Supp. at 853-54 "additional elements of 'knowledge' and
'intent' required under state law do not afford.. .rights ... 'different in kind' from those protected by the
copyright law").
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Similarly, the elements of mutual assent and consideration are not the
meaningful elements of a breach of contract claim. The elements of mutual
assent and consideration are only relevant in determining whether the
contract is enforceable and do not change the substantive meaning of a
contract. When applicable to a breach of contract claim, the second prong
of the extra elements test should turn on the conduct or act constituting the
breach. In Bowers, the shrink-wrap agreement seeks to prohibit reverse
engineering, a judicially recognized fair use under § 107 of the Copyright
Act. The additional elements of mutual asset and consideration traditionally
necessary to establish an enforceable contract merely narrow the applicability
of the state contract law. Thus, the prohibited act - wrongfully engaging in
reverse engineering - remains the same. In other words, the prohibited act,
nevertheless, touches upon federal copyright law. As such, a contractual
restriction on the right to reverse engineer should be expressly preempted
under S 301 of the Copyright Act.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit in Bowers attempts to support its
analysis with the First Circuit's reasoning in Data General. In Data General,
the First Circuit found that the Copyright Act does not preempt a state law
misappropriation of trade secret claim because in addition to copying, the
state claim required proof of a trade secret and breach of a duty of
confidentiality." 4 Trade secret laws, however, protect rights in formulas,
processes, devices, or other business information that is kept confidential to
maintain an advantage over competitors. 15- Furthermore, the concept of
protecting trade secrets resembles more closely the principles of trademark
and patent law.1" (' The court in Data General concluded that because of the
required proof of a trade secret and the breach of a duty of confidentiality,
the purpose behind protection under the state trade secret law is wholly
separate from the purposes for protection under the Copyright Act.I-7 Thus,
federal copyright law did not preempt the state claim.
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit held in Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI
Technologies, Inc., that federal copyright law did in fact preempt a state
misappropriation of trade secret claim."' The court noted that despite the
seemingly divergent purposes of federal copyright law and state
misappropriation law, the rights protected under these laws were
equivalent." ' In particular, the acts that formed the basis of the state
154 Data General, 36 F.3d at 1165.
I'5 Black's law Dictionary 1501 (7th ed. 1999).
156 Id. (citing Mark A. Rothstein, et al., Employieit Lau, S 8.18, at 516 (1994)).
15- 36 F.3d at 1165.
IsH 166 F.3d at 772.
69 Id. at 789. "In contrast to federal copyright law, which focuses on the value ofcreativity, state
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misappropriation claim were equivalent to the interests protected by the
Copyright Act, including (1) reproduction; (2) use of the protected materials
in the preparation of allegedly derivative works; and (3) distribution of such
works in competition with the copyright holder.' 6° Adopting a view similar
to the holding in Crow v. Wainwright, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
state claim required an element "different in kind" to escape federal
preemption. W
Even if, however, the rights governed under the contractual restriction
in Bowers are "different in kind" from rights governed by the Copyright Act
and are not, therefore, expressly preempted, the issue of preemption still
remains. . The contract claim may, nonetheless, be invalid under the
doctrine of implied conflict preemption. A state contract attempting to
prohibit or restrict the right of fair use, granted to the general public under
the federal Copyright law, clearly stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. Thus, the contractual restriction inBowers must be preempted. 62
In order to preempt a state contract claim under the conflicting laws
doctrine, the first question is whether the contract alters federal law.'6 If
there is an affirmative answer to the first question, the second question
becomes whether the federal law permits itself to be altered or is it merely
a default rule." If a contract attempts to alter federal law, and federal law
does not permit such alteration, states cannot enforce the contract.' 65 When
contract claims involve copyright disputes, preemption becomes a factor
where the contract attempts to change the rules as provided in the Copyright
Act of 1976.166 For example, users and/or licensees cannot force copyright
owners to give up their right to bring an action for copyright infringement
within the statutory three-year period provided in the Copyright Act.
167
misappropriation law is specifically designed to protect the labor that goes into creating the work." The
elements of proof required under the state statute included "(i) the creation by plaintiff of a product
through extensive time, labor, skill and money; (ii) the use of that product by defendant in competition
with plaintiff, thereby giving the defendant a special competitive advantage because he was burdened
with little or none ofthe expense incurred by plaintiff in the creation ofthe product; and (iii) commercial
damage to plaintiff."
16o Id. at 790.
161 Id.
162 See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987). See also Lemley,
supra note 38.





167 See ASCAP v. Pataki, 1997 WL 438849 (S.D.N.Y.).
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Similarly, copyright owners cannot force users and/or licensees to give up
their right to fair use. Section 107 of the Copyright Act explicitly provides
that "the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction..., for purposes such as criticism, comment, scholarship or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.""6 Section 107 also provides
four factors to consider in determining whether an alleged infringer's use is
fair within the meaning of the statute. 69 Reverse engineering is a fair use
often used for criticism, comment, scholarship or research. 7 ° Thus, a
blanket prohibition on reverse engineering restricts the right to fair use.
Thus, the contractual restriction in Bowers purports to alter federal law and
should be preempted.
Conflict preemption may not apply, however, in circumstances where
enforcement of a contract does not conflict with copyright policy. 17' For
example, if the conduct at issue in the contract claim also infringed
copyright, it would not conflict with copyright policy. 72 This is exactly how
the District Court in Bowers resolved the contract claim. The District Court
instructed the jury that "reverse engineering violates the license agreement
only if Baystate's product that resulted from reverse engineering infringes
Bowers' copyright because it copies protectable expression. ,73 Analyzed this
way, a court could reach the outcome by simply concluding that the
defendant engaged in copyright infringement. 74 However, if there is no
copyright infringement, holding a defendant liable for the same remedies
disguised in a breach of contract claim is contrary to the policy behind the
fair use doctrine and the doctrine of conflict preemption would be
implicated. 175 Thus, the Federal Circuit did not have to make an end run
around copyright by resorting to state law.'76 If courts could reach the same
liability outcome, it should not matter whether it was obtained through
168 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001).
169 However, such a determination is not relevant to the issue of preemption. Once we
determine whether there is preemption, § 107 allows us to determine whether the use was fair. ["In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.] 17 U.S.C. §
107(1)-(4) (2001).
170 Johnson-Laird, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. at 843.
171 See Lemley, supra note 37.
172 Id.
173 320 F.3d at 1323.
174 Id. at 1326.
175 Id.
176 Tolman, 1998 BYU.L. REV. at 318.
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federal copyright law or state contract law. The only difference is that
analyzing the problem under copyright law allows for a rule consistent with
the Supremacy Clause because it recognizes the rights afforded under the
federal copyright system.
In Bowers, the alleged infringer reverse engineered protected software.
It is unclear from the facts presented what aspects of the software Baystate
actually copied. Computer programs, however, consist of underlying
functional processes as well as creative expression.1" Copyright protection
extends only to creative expression, not ideas or functional processes. 178 If
Baystate engaged in reverse engineering to copy the program's underlying
functional processes, Bowers would not have a claim for copyright
infringement. On the other hand, Bowers would have a valid claim for
infringement if Baystate copied aspects of the program's creative expression
and such copies were to fall outside the scope of the fair use doctrine.
Whether or not the doctrine of conflict preemption actually applies to the
situation in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, the Federal Circuit's blanket rule
that contractual restrictions on reverse engineering can never be preempted
is contrary to the Supremacy Clause and the Intellectual Property Clause
embedded in the U.S. Constitution, as well as, the federal copyright system
set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976.
The Federal Circuit's analysis in Bowers is simply a blanket rule that
federal copyright law can never preempt state contract claims. This blanket
rule is contrary to the Supremacy Clause and the federal Copyright Act. It
is widely accepted that, at times, federal law may preempt state contract
claims. Thus, the outcome should not be different just because we are
dealing with copyright law. The Federal Circuit's conclusion, therefore, is
inconsistent with Congress' intent in enacting the federal intellectual
property laws. This area of the law remains heavily debated and Bowers is an
example of why a uniform standard consistent with the Supremacy Clause
is necessary.
CONCLUSION
By holding that federal copyright law does not preempt state contract
claims regardless of whether or not the contract at issue attempts to expand
or limit the rights granted to copyright holders under the Copyright Act, the
Federal Circuit majority has directly undermined the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit's analysis of preemption is
177 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
175 17 U.S.C. 102(b) (2001).
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incomplete as it fails to discuss the applicability of implied conflict
preemption. Furthermore, the majority's analysis of express preemption is
misguided. A broad interpretation of the Court's ruling - that § 301 of the
Copyright Act does not expressly preempt state contract claims because
contact claims contain extra elements rendering it qualitatively different
from a claim for infringement - leads to illogical results.
The majority's conclusion fails to recognize the fair use doctrine in § 107
of the Copyright Act. Congress explicitly intended for certain fair uses, such
as scholarship and research, to escape infringement. As courts have
continually recognized reverse engineering as a fair use of protected
software, prohibiting such an act limits the right to fair use. More broadly,
however, the majority's conclusion creates a rule that will allow private
parties to opt-out of the federal copyright system as a whole. This rule
could allow publishers to use shrink-wrap licenses to force users to waive all
rights under the Copyright Act by simply tearing open a package.17 9 A
scholar could lose his fair use privilege to quote a novel."s Similarly, a
library could lose its ability to lend books, and its ability to make archival
copies. 181 Recording companies could include a restriction inside CD
shrink-wrap packaging that forbids valid purchasers from making back-up
copies of their music. Restrictions such as these would be valid under
Bowers even though they would be direct attempts to expand the rights
granted to copyright owners under the Copyright Act. In essence, therefore,
the Federal Circuit's ruling is contrary to the purpose of copyright law - "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
179 Lemley, supra note 38.
18 Id. (citing Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 741 (2d Cir. 1991)).
181 Id. Lending books is permitted under the first sale doctrine. Making archival or preservation
copies is permitted under S 108 of the Copyright Act.
